University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy
Volume 17

Issue 2

Article 1

2006

Blameworthiness, Intent, and Cultural Dissonance: The Unequal
Treatment of Cultural Defense Defendants
Nancy S. Kim

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp
Part of the Law and Society Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Kim, Nancy S. (2006) "Blameworthiness, Intent, and Cultural Dissonance: The Unequal Treatment of
Cultural Defense Defendants," University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy: Vol. 17: Iss. 2, Article 1.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp/vol17/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

University of Florida
Journal of Law and Public Policy
AUGUST 2006

VOLUME 17

NUMBER 2

ESSAYS
BLAMEWORTHINESS, INTENT, AND CULTURAL
DISSONANCE: THE UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF CULTURAL
DEFENSE DEFENDANTS
Nancy S. Kim*
I.

INTRODUCTION

II.

THE PARADIGMATIC CASES ...........................

....................................

A. CulturalDifference as Insanity .....................

200

203
204

B. CulturalPracticesas FamiliarForms of Oppression .... 206

C. CulturalEvidence to Mystify and Exoticize ............

209

Ill.

INTENT, MOTIVE, AND CULPABILITY .....................

212

IV.

RECONCEPTUALIZING INTENT .........................

218

A. FirstLevel Intent - Intent to Act ....................
B. Second Level Intent - PurposiveIntent ...............

220
221

C. Third Level Intent V.

ContextualizedPurposive Intent ... 222

CONCLUSION ......................................

226

* Assistant Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. B.A., University of
California, Berkeley, 1987; J.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1990; LL.M., University of
California, Los Angeles, 1993. The ideas in this Essay were first presented at the American Bar
Association Crime and Culture Symposium at the University of Florida, Levin School of Law. I
am grateful to Cynthia Lee for organizing the symposium and inviting me to participate. I thank
Funmi Arewa, Michal Belknap, Seth Bums, Elaine Chiu, Mike Dessent, Floralynn Einesman,
Rashmi Goel, Jancy Hoeffel, Sanford Kadish, Cynthia Lee, Kay Levine, Ken Nunn, Linda Ramirez,
Jackie Slotkin, Janet Weinstein, Daniel Yeager, and Michael Yu for their observations, suggestions,
and comments. Any errors are mine alone.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 17

I. INTRODUCTION

Many scholars have debated the wisdom and meaning of the "cultural
defense."' The use of the term itself is a misnomer as it is rarely used to
advocate a formalized defense. 2 In this Essay, I use the term "cultural
defense" to refer to any use of cultural evidence in criminal cases to
justify, exculpate, or mitigate a defendant's actions. Multiculturalists are
often positioned against feminists on the subject of the cultural defense
because the victims of crimes giving rise to it are usually women and
children. 3
Much of the disagreement governing the admissibility of cultural
evidence pertains to its misuse in certain high profile cases. 4 The fears of
stereotyping and of perpetuation of violence against women and children
are reinforced by cases excusing grievous acts based on flimsy cultural
evidence. Other cases, however, illustrate how the exclusion of cultural
evidence may result in unfair punishment to those defendants who act with
the interests of the victim in mind. Most commentators, including this one,
1. See generally Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through
Multiculturalism:The Liberals'Dilemma,96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1996); Nancy S. Kim, The
CulturalDefense and the Problem of CulturalPreemption:A FrameworkforAnalysis,27 N.M. L.
REV. 101 (1997); Holly Maguigan, CulturalEvidence and Male Violence: Are Feminists and
MulticulturalistReformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36
(1995); Leti Volpp, (Mis)identifyingCulture:Asian Women andthe "CulturalDefense, " 17 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1994).
2. See Neil A. Gordon, Note, The Implications of Memetics for the CulturalDefense, 50
DUKE L.J. 1809, 1829-30 (2001); Volpp, supra note 1, at 57 n.l.
3. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 1, at 1094 (noting that the debate surrounding the use of
cultural evidence pits "foreign customs and cultural practices directly against essential elements
of contemporary American legal culture, including the antidiscrimination principle that is central
to equal protection doctrine and related principles of universal rights that are at the foundation of
feminist legal doctrine"). Coleman refers to the question of how to resolve these competing
interests as the "Liberals' Dilemma." Id. See also Maguigan, supra note 1, at 36 ("While both
feminists and multiculturalists have advocated for inclusion of a wider variety of voices in
American jurisprudence, they have recently perceived themselves to be on opposite sides of a
vigorously disputed issue: whether to permit criminal defendants to introduce cultural evidence");
Nilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture:CulturalApprovalof ViolenceAgainst Women in the Pacific
Asian Community and the CulturalDefense, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1312 (199 1) (discussing how
the "use of culture as a rationalization... and the various cultural beliefs and practices that support
the family structure make women 'legitimate' victims - invisible targets of violence - and
contribute to the community's failure to recognize domestic violence and rape as problems that
must be addressed").
4. These cases are usually the paradigmatic cases, as discussed in Part 1I. See generally
Coleman, supra note 1; Maguigan, supra note 1; Volpp, supra note 1.
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advocate for a "limited use" approach that would permit the introduction
of cultural evidence to establish the criminal defendant's state of mind.5
Elsewhere, I have proposed guidelines to minimize the misuse of cultural
evidence.6 Those guidelines, however, only address crimes as currently
defined and were thus limited by the inadequacies of such definitions.7
This Essay suggests that because the definition of crimes (in particular,
the definition of the mens rea element of the crime) fails to capture the
moral blameworthiness of the defendant in cultural defense cases, judges
(and juries) have rendered decisions lacking in cohesiveness.' Many
decisions are unfair because they provide for a punishment
disproportionate to the moral blameworthiness of the defendant or they
conform to certain prejudices and stereotypes held by the judge and/or
jury.' In other words, a decision-maker may adhere strictly to the
definition of a crime which may unfairly punish a member of a cultural
minority or, having decided that the crime does not adequately reflect
culpability, the decision-maker makes a decision freed from the constraints
imposed by the literal definition of a particular crime. In the latter case, the
result is often based upon unreliable evidence that conforms to the
decision-maker's biases and prejudices.
Criminal law assumes that the judge and jury share the same cultural
and experiential framework as the defendant. Accordingly, crimes are
defined with this assumption as an underlying premise. This assumption
5. See generally Kim, supra note 1, at 103 (advocating "adoption of an evidentiary
framework which would permit cultural evidence to be admitted to explain the defendant's state
of mind at the time ofthe offense"); Kay Levine, Negotiatingthe Boundariesof Crimeand Culture:
A SociolegalPerspective on CulturalDefense Strategies,28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39, 72 (2003)
("In order to fully evaluate the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime, the jury must be
allowed to consider evidence of the defendant's reliance on cultural interpretations and practices,
even if those interpretations and practices are directly at odds with U.S. traditions."); Maguigan,
supra note 1, at 36 ("endorsing admissibility of cultural information to the extent the evidence is
relevant to prove a defendant's mens rea") but see Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Culture, Cloaked
in Mens Rea, 100 S. ATLANTIC Q. 981, 982 (2002) (arguing that the use of immigrant cultural
evidence should not be permitted to show mens rea); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, THE CULTURAL
DEFENSE 200-01 (2004) (discussing why a formal cultural defense is necessary and arguing that
courts should consider cultural evidence in all cases).
6. Kim, supranote 1,at 116, 139.
7. See generally Kim, supra note 1.
8. As Maguigan notes, the admissibility ofcultural evidence has been inconsistent: "In some
cases cultural information is excluded completely. In others, the information is received
unchallenged during plea negotiations or at trial in a way that trivializes violence against women
or family members as customary." Maguigan, supra note 1, at 87.
9. For an intriguing discussion of moral blame in the law, see Peter Arenella, Convicting
the Morally Blameless: Reassessingthe RelationshipBetween LegalandMoralAccountability,39
UCLA L. REv. 1511 (1992).
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is manifested by the well-established promise of the law to an accused of
a jury comprised of "one's peers" which presumably safeguards against
prejudice. This promise, however, has its limitations. Ajury of one's peers
is unlikely where, for example, the defendant is a Hmong tribesman.
The determination of mens rea may not reflect culpability because the
definition of the crime itselffails to account for the cultural dissonance that
often exists between the judge/juror and the accused. I use the term
"cultural dissonance" to refer to differing sociocultural and experiential
backgrounds. As the paradigmatic cases discussed in Part II illustrate,
permitting cultural evidence to shed light on mens rea is only helpful if the
definition of the crime is itself culturally neutral. Admittedly, attaining
cultural "neutrality" is a difficult, if not impossible, task. Yet, a fuller
understanding of the defendant's actions would at least enhance awareness
of assumptions created by cultural dissonance.
In Part II of this Essay, I examine the (mis)use of cultural evidence in
several well-known, paradigmatic cultural defense cases. In this part, I
also explain how the treatment of cultural evidence in these cases
exacerbates the debate between feminists and multiculturalists. In Part 111,
I examine the relationship between mental states and culpability in the
law. In Part IV, I propose an analysis and reconceptualization of intent that
bridges gaps in perception and understanding attributable to cultural
dissonance. My proposal is admittedly a radical departure from the way
that crimes are currently defined and analyzed. First, I propose making
intent relevant to all crimes that currently have a mens rea element. Then
I suggest an expanded notion of intent that recognizes and considers
differences between the decision-maker and the defendant.
Discussions of cultural defenses are often framed around the issue of
is it to punish morally
the primary purpose of criminal law blameworthy behavior, or is it to educate and deter harmful conduct? That
question, while an important one, is not the focus of this Essay. This Essay
assumes that one of the primary functions of criminal law is to provide
individualized justice, an objective which reflects our society's
commitment to the values of autonomy.' ° This is not the same thing as
saying individualized justice is the sole function of criminal law, or that
the goal of individualized justice is more important than the other goals of
criminal law. Rather, the thesis of this Essay is that to the extent that we

10. See Sanford Kadish, The Decline oflnnocence, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN
THE CRIMiNAL LAW 65, 77 (1987) ("Much of our commitment to democratic values, to human
dignity and self-determination to the value of the individual, turns on the pivot of a view of man
as a responsible agent entitled to be praised or blamed depending upon his free choice of
conduct.").
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recognize that criminal law should provide individualized justice, we
should implement steps to ensure that our judgment and understanding of
the conduct in question is appropriately contextualized to accomplish that
objective.
The law establishes that, for most crimes, an action must be
accompanied by a particular mental state. An understanding of the
defendant's mental state is incomplete without an understanding of
cultural context. A broader understanding of the defendant's mental state
would not result in exculpation in all cultural defense cases nor does it
defer to non-U.S. legal systems. What I am proposing in this Essay is not
to excuse defendants who are members of cultural minorities from crimes
that they have committed; rather, I am proposing that we examine more
closely whether what we have sought to achieve by requiring the mens rea
element in crimes is, in fact, accomplished where the defendant is a
member of a cultural minority. Rather than providing a separate set of
standards for defendants who are members of a cultural minority, my
proposed reconceptualization of intent seeks to fairly apply the existing
law. Currently, the actions of the defendant are understood and perceived
through a "cultural lens" that is susceptible to distortion when there is
cultural dissonance between the decision-maker and the defendant. My
proposed three part analysis of intent strives to minimize the likelihood,
or at least the degree, of that distortion without adopting a strong relativist
position which prioritizes the culture of the defendant over the dominant
norms of American society. In other words, recognizing cultural context
does not favor cultural minorities. Such recognition simply levels the
playing field by not disfavoring them. All actions do not carry the same
cultural significance. In particular, actions may not carry the same
significance that they might have in the dominant culture. By unveiling
cultural assumptions, we move closer to a criminal justice system that
treats defendants who are members of a cultural minority in the same way
that it treats majority culture defendants.
II. THE PARADIGMATIC CASES

In this part I have selected three of the most often discussed cases to
illustrate the misuse of the cultural defense. Although there are other more
recent examples of the cultural defense, I have selected the following as
the paradigmatic cases because they best illustrate the problems that
commonly arise with the use of cultural evidence in the courtroom. The
categories are only intended to frame the discussion of the cultural
defense; they are not intended to be mutually exclusive. In other words, I

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW & PUBLICPOLICY

[Vol. 17

have selected one case to illustrate each "type" of cultural misuse, even
though each case might also provide an example of one or more of the
other types of misuse."
A. CulturalDifference as Insanity
In People v. Kimura,2 the defendant Fumiko Kimura attempted to
drown herself and her two children after learning of her husband's
adultery.' 3 She had tried to commit the Japanese custom of oya-ko shinju,
or parent-child suicide.' 4 Although illegal in Japan, oya-ko shinju is
recognized as an ancestral practice. 5 The Japanese-American community
gathered a petition with over 25,000 signatures stating that had the act
occurred in Japan, Kimura would have received at most a light, suspended
sentence and probation.16 Although originally charged with murder and
felony endangerment under California law, the prosecution allowed
Kimura's plea of manslaughter. 7 Instead, however, of arguing that her
actions were reasonable given her cultural background, her attorneys
argued that she was temporarily insane at the time she committed the
crime.' 8 Evidence of her practice of oya-ko shinju was deemed to be
evidence of temporary insanity.19 Even though culture was not expressly

11. For example, while I use People v. Chen, No. 87-774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1988), to
illustrate how cultural evidence was misused to reinforce an oppressive practice, it could also be
used to show how such evidence was used to establish temporary insanity and to exoticize Chinese
culture. See Part H (b) and (c).
12. No. A-091133 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Nov. 21, 1985) (unpublished decision), cited in
Taryn F. Goldstein, Comment, Cultural Conflict in Court: Should the American CriminalJustice
System FormallyRecognize a 'CulturalDefense'?, 99 DICK. L. REv. 141, 147-49 n.54 (1994). For
further discussions of Kimura, see Alison Dundes Renteln, A Justificationof the CulturalDefense
as PartialExcuse, 2 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 437; 462, 463-64,(1993); Rashmi Goel,
Can I Call Kimura Crazy? Ethical Tensions in the CulturalDefense, 3 SEATrLE J. FOR SOC. JUST.
443,443-44 (2004); Deborah Woo, The People v. Fumiko Kimura: But Which People, 17 INT'L J.
Soc. L. 403 (1989).
13. See Goel, supranote 12, at 443; Goldstein, supra note 12, at 147.
14. See Daina C. Chiu, Comment, The CulturalDefense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation,
and Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1053, 1100 (1994); Woo, supra note 12, at 404.
15. See Goel, supranote 12, at 443.
16. Spencer Sherman, Legal Clash of Cultures, NAT'L L.J. 1 (1985); RENTELN, supra note
5, at 25.
17. CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE
CRIMINAL COURTROOM 121-22 (2003).

18. See id. at 122; RENTELN, supra note 5, at 25. The California legislature abolished
diminished capacity as a defense in 1982 which explains why Kimura pled manslaughter even
though the basis of the plea was "temporary insanity." CAL. PENAL CODE § 25 (Deering 1985).
19. See Ann T. Lam, Culture as a Defense: PreventingJudicialBias Against Asians and
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acknowledged as a mitigating factor in the determination of Kimura's
liability, the judge took it into account in accepting her plea.2° Cultural
evidence was not used to prove, or disprove, an element of mens rea, but
to provide the defendant with a de facto substantive cognitive insanity
defense. 2'
The decision in Kimura imposed an Anglo-American judgment on the
defendant's actions that conflicted with her Japanese cultural views.22
Given Japanese conceptions of shame, suicide, and parental obligations,
Kimura's actions do not indicate mental insanity.23 The evidence was
introduced not to establish that Kimura acted contrary to the norms of
Japanese culture, but that she was insane because she acted in conformity
with them.24
The finding of "temporary insanity" in Kimura was compelled by the
failure of the criminal law to define crimes to correspond with
culpability.' Under California law, murder is defined as the unlawful

Pacific Islanders, I ASIAN AM. PAC. ISLAND L.J. 49, 61 (1993).
20. Alison Matsumoto, A Placefor Considerationof Culture in the American Criminal
Justice System: JapaneseLaw and the Kimura Case, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 507, 526 (1995).
21. See Lam, supra note 19, at 60-61. See also Goel, supra note 12, at 443 ("Fumiko
Kimura's lawyer interposed the defense of temporary insanity, based in part on a belief that any
mother who kills her children must be insane.").
22. Goel, supra note 12, at 448 (stating that Kimura was judged "by a narrow Western
conception of sanity, one she could not possibly meet because her own cultural views on suicide
and mothering stood in stark contrast."); Woo, supra note 12, at 410-13.
23. See Goel, supra note 12, at 445-49. As Goel points out: "Kimura was not charged with
the crime of attempted suicide, but with the murder of her two children. Under California criminal
law, Kimura must be culpable precisely because she failed to recognize her children as separate
entities .... Yet for Fumiko Kimura to acknowledge her children as separate entities would brand
her a bad mother." Id. at 448-49. See also Yuko Kawanishi, Japanese Mother-ChildSuicide: The
PsychologicalandSociologicalImplicationsof the KimuraCase, 8 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 32, 3435 (1990) (stating that Japanese mothers have an extreme form of ego extension with respect to
their children and lack a sense of boundaries between themselves and their children as separate
individuals).
24. This is not to say that Kimura's actions would have been condoned in Japanese society,
but only that they would have been viewed in a different way - a way that would have been more
sympathetic to her actions. See Kim, supranote 1, at 117; see also Robert W. Stewart, Probation
Given to Mother in Drowning of Her Two Children,L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1985, at B7; Renteln,
supra note 12, at 463 nn.91-92.
25. Although the meaning of the word "insanity" differs depending upon the circumstances,
in jurisdictions where it may be used as a defense to criminal prosecution, under the M'Naghten
rule, an accused is not criminally responsible if, at the time of committing the act, she was
"laboring under such a defect of reason.., as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing, or if he did not know it that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 7.2 (4th ed. 2003).
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killing of a human being with malice aforethought.26 Voluntary
manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice and
upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.27 Malice is defined as "a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature" or when
"no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances
attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart."28
Even though Kimura, in attempting parent-child suicide, was reacting
to her husband's infidelity, there was no evidence that she was acting
"upon a sudden quarrel" or "heat of passion." In fact, her actions indicated
deliberation and premeditation.29 Yet, the prosecution and the sentencing
judge recognized that it would be unjust to punish Kimura for murder
given that she did not act with the same evilness as one, for example, who
kills another out of spite.3" Rather than prosecuting Kimura for a crime that
did not fit her culpability, the prosecution accepted a plea bargain for a
crime that did not fit her actions. Because the definition of the crime of
murder did not capture the culpability of the defendant, the prosecution
disregarded the strictures of that definition and sought a punishment that
fit the defendant's act. Although Kimura's actions constituted murder,
punishment for manslaughter was deemed appropriate given her cultural
background.
B. CulturalPracticesas FamiliarForms of Oppression
The case of People v. Chen3 illustrates how cultural evidence can be
used to excuse behavior that reinforces oppressive practices or beliefs in
the United States. In Chen, the defendant Dong Lu Chen killed his wife
with a hammer after learning of her infidelity.32 His attorney argued that

26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 2005).
27. § 192.

28. § 188 (West 1988).
29. See Kim, supra note 1, at 118. "Kimura took a bus from her home here in Tarzana,
California to Santa Monica, a trip which took approximately two hours. She left the stroller at the
bus stop, presumedly because she knew she would no longer need it. Kimura clearly intended to
kill her children, as well as herself." Id. The deputy district attorney, Lauren Weiss, noted that, "[i]f
in fact, she was doing everything according to cultural precepts, it would have supplied elements
of the prosecution case, because then it would have showed she intended to kill her kids - intent
to kill. I could have gotten a first-degree murder conviction." Woo, supra note 12, at 405.
30. The prosecution stated that "to punish somebody like this woman by sending her to state
prison, I don't think society would benefit from it." Robert W. Stewart, ProbationGiven to Mother
in Drowning of Her Two Children, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 22, 1985, at B7.
31. No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Super. Ct., Mar. 21, 1989) (unpublished decision), citedin Goldstein,
supra note 12, at 151; Renteln, supranote 12, at 439, 480-81.
32. Celestine Bohlen, Holtzman MayAppeal Probationforlmmigrantin Wife's Slaying,N.Y.
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Chen, who was Chinese-American, suffered from diminished capacity as
a result of his cultural background.33 The defense argued that Chen's actions were "reasonable" under the circumstances because a wife's adultery
is a stain upon a Chinese husband's honor.34 Although originally charged
with second degree murder," the judge found Chen guilty of the lesser
charge of second degree manslaughter 6 after he heard testimony that Chinese culture condemned adultery.37
Evidence of Chen's cultural background could have been used to
provide an affirmative defense to second degree murder (i.e., that he acted
"under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance") which would
have led to a conviction on the lesser offense of first degree
manslaughter.38 The facts, however, do not support a finding of second
degree manslaughter. Second degree manslaughter under New York law
is defined as "recklessly"39 causing the death of another person."° Chen hit
his wife in the head eight times with a hammer, 4' actions which clearly
indicate something more deliberate than "reckless" behavior.

TIMES, Apr. 5, 1989, at B3.
33. Chen's attorney stated that the "basis for the defense was not that it's acceptable to kill
your wife in China. The basis of the defense is the emotional strain based on cultural differences
and the state of the defendant's mind." Leslie Gevirtz, Immigrant Gets Probationfor Killing Wife,
U.P.I., Mar. 31, 1989, available at LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, UPI File (quoting defense
attorney Stewart Orden).
34. See LEE, supra note 17, at 114.
35. Under New York law:
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree [w]hen: with intent to cause the
death of another person, he [or she] causes the death of such person or of a third
person... except that it is an affirmative defense that: (a) The defendant acted
under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a
reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness ofwhich is to be determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the
circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1) (McKinney 2005).
36. See Bohlen, supra note 32.
37. Id.
38. First degree manslaughter is defined as when a person "with intent to cause the death of
another person, he [or she] causes the death of such person or of a third person under circumstances
which do not constitute murder because he [or she] acted under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20(2).
39. N.Y. PENALLAW § 125.15(1).
40. "Recklessness" is defined in New York as being aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk and consciously disregarding that risk. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05.
41. Bohlen, supranote 32, at B3.
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Consequently, it would have been more appropriate for Chen to be
prosecuted for first degree manslaughter.42
While Chen's cultural background was appropriately used to provide
an affirmative defense to murder (by showing "diminished capacity"), it
was inappropriately used to change the nature of his actions. The judge in
Chen stated that the defendant's cultural background made him more
"susceptible to cracking under the circumstances. 43 Yet the issue of
"cracking" is relevant only to defend against a charge of murder; it does
not establish "recklessness." The judge in Chen, however, believed that the
defendant's actions did not constitute first degree manslaughter, not
because they failed to fit the technical definition of the crime (which they
did), but because they did not warrant the punishment." The judge used
cultural evidence to cloud the issues that were relevant. Instead of using
the evidence to determine whether Chen's background made him so
enraged that he was extremely emotionally disturbed, the judge used it to
further his own notion of justice. Under the guise of using cultural
evidence to determine mens rea, he used it to distort the existing definition
of manslaughter in order to reach his desired sentence for the defendant.
The judge in Chen stated that the defendant was "driven to violence by
traditional Chinese values about adultery and loss of manhood. ' '5 What he
failed to note, however, was that traditional American values also
condemn adultery. Yet, as in the Chen case, punishment for "crimes of
passion" (i.e., where the husband killed an adulterous wife) has
historically been treated differently from other types of killings. 46 As
Cynthia Lee notes, "Chen's claim of reasonableness is very similar to
claims of reasonableness made by American men charged with murdering
their wives. American men who kill their wives, like Chen, often base their
claims of reasonableness on the threat to masculine honor and identity
posed by a wife's sexual infidelity. ' 7 In other words, the judge's lenience
in Chen is similar to other cases involving non-immigrant men who kill
their wives upon discovery of adultery. According to Lee, one possible
explanation for the outcome in Chen is that "immigrant and minority
42. See N.Y. PENALLAW § 125.20(2); supra note 38.
43. Goldstein, supra note 12, at 152.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Coleman, supra note 5, at 984-85. In fact, Coleman states that the New York legislature
provided for extreme emotional disturbance as a defense to second degree murder specifically so
such "crimes of passion" would be dealt with as manslaughter and not second degree murder. Id.
at 985. See alsoJames J. Sing, Note, Cultureas Sameness: TowardaSynthetic View ofProvocation
and Culture in the CriminalLaw, 108 YALE L.J. 1845, 1868-69 (1999).
47. LEE, supra note 17, at 114.
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defendant claims which serve the dominant culture are more likely to
' The judge's
succeed than claims that do not serve dominant interests."48
decision in Chen perpetuated existing dominant cultural norms of female
sexuality and of a husband's proprietary interest in his wife. These norms
are not reflected in the ideals and aspirations of American society - but
they do reflect its realities.4 9 In Chen, culture was a convenient way to
obfuscate the judge's decision-making process. The result was a sentence
that perpetuated familiar oppressive practices rather than eliminating
them.5 °
C. CulturalEvidence to Mystify and Exoticize
People v. Moua5 ' illustrates how cultural evidence may exoticize the
defendant in such a way that the determination of the existence of the
practice - or the commission of the practice - becomes forgotten. In
Moua, the defendant was accused of the kidnapping and rape of a
woman.52 The defendant claimed that his actions were part of a Hmong
marriage ritual.5 3 The only data presented by the defense, however, was a
twenty-two page pamphlet that cited only one reference. 4 It is unlikely
that such flimsy evidence would have passed muster under the standards
typically required for admissibility of expert testimony.5 The judge eventually dropped the kidnapping 6and rape charges and the defendant pleaded
5
guilty to false imprisonment.

48. Id. at 112. See generally id. (arguing that successful uses of culture in the courtroom can
be understood as cases where the minority defendant's interests converge with dominant majority
interests). The principle of interest convergence was first articulated by Derrick Bell. See Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L.
REv. 518, 522 (1980).
49. See Chiu, supra note 14, at 1113-14.
50. See Sing, supra note 46, at 1876-78 (noting that a "fixation on cultural symmetry
suppressed the possibility that Chen's actions may not have been culturally typical, and thus likely
caused the court to rely on racial stereotypes and antiempirical assumptions in identifying the
defendant's cultural values.").
51. Case No. 315972-0 (Fresno Super. Ct. 1985) (unpublished decision), cited in Renteln,
supra note 12, at 445 n. 19.
52. Renteln, supra note 12, at 445 n.19.
53. Id.
54. See Kim, supranote 1, at 124; Deidre Evans-Pritchard & Alison Dundes Renteln, The
Interpretationand Distortion of Culture: A Hmong "Marriage by Capture" Case in Fresno,
California,4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 20 (1990).
55. Kim, supra note 1, at 124. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as interpreted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical,Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 590-93 (1993)
(requiring that expert testimony be based on good grounds to ensure that it is scientifically valid).
56. RENTELN, supra note 5, at 127.
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The judge understood that Moua's cultural background affected his
culpability, but was in a quandary with respect to how to use the cultural
evidence presented by the defense. The Hmong marriage ritual was so
unfamiliar to the decision-maker that it overpowered the limited purpose
for which it should have been used - to establish whether a reasonable
Hmong person would have mistaken the woman's actions for consent.57
Moua involved a classic case of "mistake of fact" as to consent. 8 The law,
however, requires that the mistake be an objectively reasonable one. 9 As
Renteln explains, an "objective reasonable person would not have thought
that [the victim] was consenting, even if the average reasonable Hmong
person would have thought so." 6 Because an "objective" standard imposes an Anglo-American perspective on a non-Anglo-American act, the
defense of mistake of fact fails to adequately protect cultural minorities.6 '
On the other hand, that the objective standard disadvantages minorities
should not mean that all charges should be dropped or that the defendant's
version of events should prevail. In Moua, for example, the woman's
family considered the defendant's action to be rape, not marriage.62
Moua is similar to date-rape cases which also involve mistake of fact
analysis - but the parties involved were members of the Hmong
community rather than the larger Anglo-American population. Even where
both parties are Anglo-American, in a date-rape case, men and women
may have conflicting views of what happened. The decision-maker is thus
required to step outside his or her own gendered perspective in order to
understand both sides of the story. In date-rape cultural defense situations,
the decision-maker is required to widen his or her frame of reference to
include gender, cultural, and gender-cultural differences. In Moua,
because the determination of a reasonable mistake could not be
accommodated within the existing legal framework, the judge stepped out
of that framework. The judge, distracted by the foreignness of the cultural
practice, abdicated responsibility for sorting through the morass of
conflicting testimony. Because the Hmong marriage ritual was so different
from Anglo-American methods of courtship and marriage, the judge had
57. See CULTURAL ISSuES IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE § 7.3(a) (James G. Connell, III& Rene L.

Valladares eds., 2000).
58. RENTELN, supra note 5, at 127.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 128 (stating that an obstacle to the use of the cultural defense is continued
adherence to objective reasonableness because the "objective person is the persona of the AngloSaxon, or European, it will be virtually impossible for a defendant to avail himself of a defense in
the criminal law which is theoretically available to all").
62. Id. at 127.
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difficulty evaluating the case (including the evidence of the existence of
the ritual) the way that he would rape cases involving dominant culture
parties. The foreignness of the cultural evidence so mystified and diverted
the decision-maker that it made it hard to adequately judge its validity and
relevance to the facts at hand.
In this part I have discussed three paradigmatic cultural defense cases
to illustrate the predominant misuses of cultural evidence. Not
surprisingly, each case could also be used as an example of more than one
misuse. Chen, for example, could be used to show "cultural difference as
insanity" because the cultural evidence was used to demonstrate that
reasonable Chinese men are more apt to be driven "crazy" by their wife's
infidelity than reasonable Anglo-American men. Chen also illustrates how
cultural evidence can exoticize the defendant to such an extent that it so
mystifies and diverts the decision-maker that its validity goes
unquestioned.63
These three cases have intensified the multiculturalist-feminist debate
concerning the use of the cultural defense. Because women are
subordinated in most societies to men, and children are subordinated to
adults, many of the cultural defense cases involve practices that harm
women and children.' Yet, a failure to acknowledge the role that a
defendant's cultural background plays in his or her actions by default
assumes an Anglo-American perspective. Thus, a member of a cultural
minority is not accorded the same treatment within the legal system as a
member of the cultural majority.
In Part HI, Iexamine how criminal law views the relationship between
mental states and culpability, and culpability and punishment. I propose
that because culpability cannot be fairly established without consideration
of intent, most crimes should require an intent element. But my proposal
goes beyond requiring intent as an element of a crime; it proposes an
expanded analysis of intent. I argue that criminal law's current treatment
of "intent" is too narrow, and fails to contextualize actions. Consequently,

63. Many commentators have criticized the evidence presented in Chen as an inaccurate
depiction of contemporary Chinese culture. See, e.g., Volpp, supranote 1, at 66-73; see also Dick
Polman, When is CulturalDifference a Legal Defense? Immigrants'Native TraditionsClash with
U.S.Law, SEATTLE TIMES, July 12, 1989, at Al.
64. See Melissa Spatz, A "Lesser" Crime: A ComparativeStudy ofLegal Defensesfor Men
Who Kill Their Wives, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 597, 626-27 (1991); see also Rimonte, supra
note 3 (discussing how Pacific Asian culture may facilitate the decriminalization of violence against
women); Nancy A. Wanderer & Catherine R. Connors, Culture and Crime: Kargar and the
Existing Frameworkfor a CulturalDefense, 47 BuFF. L. REV. 829, 867 (1999) (noting that "the
area of sexuality and family relations in general is the ripest for potential cultural clashes because
it is that aspect of life in which cultures often vary most significantly").
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a failure to adjust for cultural dissonance effectively discriminates against
defendants who are members of cultural minorities.
III. INTENT, MOTIVE, AND CULPABILITY

Most crimes consist of an overt physical act, or actus reus, and a guilty
mind, or mens rea. 65 Mens rea refers to the particular mental state required
for a particular crime.66 Different crimes require different mental states,
with the more serious crimes typically requiring a more conscious state of
mind. For example, under the Model Penal Code, murder is committed
"purposely or knowingly" or "recklessly under circumstances manifesting
' Manslaughter is comextreme indifference to the value of human life."67
mitted "recklessly" or under "extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse." ' Negligent homicide is
a killing committed "negligently.,

69 The United

States Supreme Court has

commented on this correlation between mental states and crimes, stating
that "[d]eeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more
purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and,
therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished."7
Theorists generally acknowledge the role of criminal law to punish
according to moral wrongfulness, or a "will to injure."'" The mens rea element of crimes reflects attribution of that moral blameworthiness.72 This
explains why duress, insanity, and self-defense are well established
defenses to crimes - while the defendant may have committed the
requisite criminal act, he or she is not as morally blameworthy because of
some extenuating circumstance.73

65. See BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY(7th ed. 2004) (defining actus reus as "the wrongful deed
that comprises the physical components of a crime and that generally must be coupled with mens
rea."); see also LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 3.4.
66. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 2004); see also LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 5.1.
67. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (2002).
68. § 210.3.
69. § 210.4.
70. Tison v. Arizon, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987).
71. See Guyora Binder, The Rhetoric of Motive and Intent, 6 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 9-10
(2002) (discussing Henry De Bracton's thirteenth century treatise on English law).
72. Id.at 11.
73. See Paul H. Robinson, Imputed CriminalLiability,93 YALE L.J. 609 (1984) (stating that
even where all the elements of a crime are proven, exceptions "such as insanity, duress, and law
enforcement authority, can exculpate an actor even though his conduct and state of mind satisfy the
paradigm of the offense charged.") Id. at 612.
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In many jurisdictions, although not in those following the Model Penal
Code, crimes are categorized as general intent and specific intent crimes.74
Specific intent crimes require that the defendant had a further specified
purpose or intent above and beyond the intent to commit the actus reus.75
General intent crimes require that the defendant only had a general
blameworthy state of mind at the time the act was performed.7 6 Motive has
long been deemed irrelevant to the determination of whether a crime has
been committed." Many scholars, however, debate the wisdom and even
the accuracy of the maxim that "motive is irrelevant to the criminal law.""8
Guyora Binder remarks that "[t]he motive is irrelevant maxim has
somehow survived a century of logical, descriptive and normative
criticism."79 Yet, even defenders of the "motive is irrelevant" maxim
acknowledge that in certain cases, such as with specific intent crimes,
criminal law does consider motive. 0
As Wayne LaFave notes:
It is often said that motive is immaterial in the substantive criminal
law, and that the most laudable motive is no defense while a bad
motive cannot make an otherwise innocent act criminal. On the
other hand, it has sometimes been claimed that the substantive law
frequently takes account of good and bad motives. These differing
viewpoints, it would seem, are attributable to disagreement as to
what is meant by the word "motive" and how it differs from
"intention," a matter which has caused the theorists considerable
difficulty for years . . . it is typical to clarify the definition [of

74. LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 5.2.

75. Jeremy M. Miller, Mens Rea Quagmire: The Conscience or Consciousness of the
Criminal Law, 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 21, 32 (2001). These states include California, Colorado,
Louisiana, and New Mexico.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 5.3(a).
79. See generally Binder, supra note 71, at 1; Elaine M. Chiu, The Challengeof Motive in
the CriminalLaw,8 BUFF. CRIvi. L. REV. 653 (2005) (proposing that motive should be considered
to determine both liability and punishment); Douglas N. Husak, Motive and CriminalLiability, 8
CRIM. JUST. ETHICs 3 (1989).

80. Chiu observes that defenders of the maxim often qualify its applicability in situations
where motive is specifically made relevant as part of the definition of the crime or where there is
an established defense that requires the establishment of a motive: "Although stated for the purpose
of defending the irrelevance maxim, such qualifications are basically a concession that specific
intent crimes, inchoate crimes, and the defenses ofprovocation, insanity, necessity and self-defense
have long regarded the motives of a defendant in determining criminal liability." Chiu, supra note
79, at 663.
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motive and intention] with an illustration, such as that when A
murders B in order to obtain B's money, A's intent was to kill and
his motive was to get the money. Such an illustration might well
suggest that "intent" is limited to one's purpose to commit the
proscribed act . . . and that all inquiries into why one did the
proscibed act are concerned with motive. This view has sometimes
been taken. But, if this view is correct, then the notion that motive
is immaterial in the substantive criminal law is wrong, for there are
a number of instances in which this inquiry into why an act was
committed is crucial in determining whether or not the defendant
has committed a given crime. For example, if one evening A breaks
into B's house, it is most important to know why he did so, as it is
burglary only if he did so for the purpose of committing a felony.
Likewise, if C shoots and kills D, it may well be important to
determine why he did so, for if he acted in self-defense he is not
guilty of murder.8'
As the above illustration shows, the distinction between motive and intent
is often puzzling and elusive. 2 The debate surrounding motive is part of
the general confusion surrounding mens rea which has been referred to as
a "baffling problem, 83 "notoriously elusive,"8 " and a "quagmire." 85 Theoretically, criminal law punishes those who are culpable in the sense of

81. LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 5.2.
82. Chiu states that the task of defining motive is complicated "especially when juxtaposed
against the concept of intent or mens rea. This is an interesting juxtaposition because while both
motive and intent refer to mental states, one has been deemed irrelevant to criminal liability while
the other is central to it." Chui, supra note 79, at 664. Binder describes three types of arguments
against the irrelevance of motive maxim:
(1) logical critiques of the irrelevance of motive maxim as premised on a false
dichotomy between motive and intent; (2) empirical claims that the irrelevance of
motive was false as a description of established criminal law; and (3) normative
arguments that criminal liability should be conditioned on motive because it is
relevant to moral blame.
Binder, supranote 71, at 45.
83. See Frances Bowes Sayre, The PresentSignification of Mens Rea in the CriminalLaw,
in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 399, 411 (1934).
84. Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the
CriminalLaw Pastand Present, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 635, 637-38 (1993). Gardner states that "few
conceptual pursuits in any area of the law have proven so beguiling as the attempt to give an
accurate account of the so-called mental element required for criminal liability." Id.
85. See Miller, supra note 75, at 21.
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being morally blameworthy,86 yet many state laws assign different terms
to signify culpability for different crimes.8 7 Thus, "culpability" often
means something other than moral blameworthiness, 8 and mens rea can
refer to either an element of a crime or a blameworthy state of mind.89 The
Model Penal Code, for example, defines four kinds of culpability:
purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently.9" Punishment is
apportioned pursuant to crime. Thus culpability, as statutorily defined, is
intended to assign punishment according to moral blameworthiness.9"
Someone who acts purposely to injure another is more morally
blameworthy than one whose negligent act results in injury to another.
Accordingly, one who acts purposely to injure another should be punished
more severely than one who injured only negligently. The concepts of
culpability, blameworthiness and punishment are thus intertwined within
the statutory definitions of crimes.92 Yet, if culpability does not consider
the defendant's motives, it fails to adequately consider the defendant's
blameworthiness, and a failure to consider blameworthiness results in
punishments that do not fit the crime.9 3 For example, does a defendant who
86. In fact, many scholars use the terms "culpable" and "blameworthy" interchangeably. See,
e.g., John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal
CriminalInterpretation,85 VA. L. REv. 1021, 1026-27 (1999) ("I adopt this conventional definition
of blameworthiness or culpability.").
87. As Kyron Huigens observes, the words "culpability," "responsibility,"
"blameworthiness," and "desert" are often used interchangeably even though they have different
meanings, and each is often used to mean more than one thing. Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the
PenaltyPhase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 1195 (2000).
88. See Robinson, supra note 73, at 862-63.
89. See Gardner, supra note 84, at 641. Gardner identifies two levels of mens rea:
one essentially describes the mental states necessary for the commission of various
crimes, while the other embraces the moral principle that certain defendants
cannot justifiably be punished even though their conduct and their state of mind
meet the definition of a particular crime. Thus, while a defendant might possess
the "mens rea" necessary to commit the offense as defined by the legislature, she
may lack the "mens rea" essential for a finding of blameworthiness and
punishability.
Id.
90. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2002).

91. See Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REv. 463,495 (1992).
92. See Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability,DangerousnessandHarm:Balancingthe Factorson
Which our CriminalLaw is Predicated,66 N.C. L. REv. 283 (1988).
93. Robinson explains the three primary functions of criminal law:
First, it must define and announce the conduct that is prohibited by the criminal
law ....

It must decide whether the violation merits criminal liability ... It
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purposely kills a terminally ill friend to end her suffering deserve the same
punishment as a defendant who accidentally kills a stranger while trying
to steal her purse?
The standards of negligence and recklessness further complicate the
meaning of intent. Courts will often claim that intent is required, and then
state that intent may be inferred from reckless or negligent conduct.94
Wayne LaFave notes that "[i]t would make for clearer analysis if courts
would merely acknowledge that for some crimes intent is not needed and
that recklessness or negligence will suffice." ' Yet, because the standards
of negligence and recklessness require that the decision-maker interpret
the defendant's actions through the lens of the majority culture's norms
without regardto her actual intent in so acting, the decision-maker may
incorrectly interpret those actions where the actor is a member of a cultural
minority. As Guyora Binder asks: "[S]hould we really punish on the basis
of the social meaning of offenses, rather than the offender's
blameworthiness? After all, there can be a disjunction between the social
meaning of an act and the actor's intent in committing it." '96
What if an adult leaves her child because she cannot afford a babysitter
and has to work the night shift? What if that adult comes from a country
where extended family members and neighbors typically provide help with
childcare - a support system that is missing in the United States? Even
by majority cultural standards, is that parent as morally blameworthy as
the parent who leaves her child at home to go drinking in a bar? Is that
parent equally culpable? Should she be?
Crimes are defined by matching an act to a state of mind. The moral
judgment of the community is reflected in the culpability assigned to the
crime. Crimes committed negligently are not as "bad" as those committed
intentionally. Culpability standards reflect and assume community norms,
but which community? Whose norms?9 7 If the answer is the dominant
typically assesses ex post whether the violation is sufficiently blameworthy to
"warrant the condemnation of conviction." Finally, where liability is to be
imposed, criminal law doctrine must assess the relative seriousness of the offense,
usually a function of the relative blameworthiness of the offender.
Paul H. Robinson, A FunctionalAnalysis ofCriminalLaw, 88 Nw. U.L. REV. 857, 857 (1994).
94. LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 5.2(e) (citing Holmes, J., in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138
Mass. 165, 52 Am.REP. 264 (1884)).
95. Id.
96. Guyora Binder, Meaning and Motive in the Law of Homicide: Samuel H. Pillsbury's
JudgingEvil: Rethinking The Law ofMurder and Manslaughter,3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 755,764
(2000) (book review).
97. One commentator has argued that "the failure to recognize cultural evidence in cases
involving nonvolitional behavior violates norms of procedural fairness and betrays the spirit of the
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mainstream community - the "reasonable Anglo-American," - then
culpability as currently defined does not reflect blameworthiness.9" The
socializing, normative-setting aspect of criminal law then trumps the goal
of individualized justice.9
Yet, one of the normative goals of American society is the recognition
of individual differences and freedoms." The Declaration of Independence promises all citizens' ° ' certain inalienable rights including "life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Citizens are promised that no state
shall deny them equal protection under the law.' 02 American legal history
is replete with attempts to balance the rights of society with the rights of
individuals. The issues which have led to consideration of a cultural
defense arise naturally as a result of the maturation of a society dominated
by non-native citizens and populated by immigrants. 03
' Ignoring the moral
antidiscrimination principle." Sing, supra note 46, at 1880. Sing explains that since the provocation
doctrine is essentially a "dominant cultural defense," denying foreign defendants the right to
introduce cultural evidence effectively denies them use of the provocation doctrine. Id. at 1878.
98. The idea of an objective standard of blameworthiness is subject to debate. For example,
Richard Delgado has argued that maintaining objective standards maintains the position of those
already in power. See Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power,77 CORNELL L. REV.
813 (1992).
99. John Diamond argues that contemporary criminal law is not a morality-based construct
but "rather a mechanism by which society conveys its core ideology." John L. Diamond, An
IdeologicalApproach to Excuse in CriminalLaw, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT
1, (1999). In the area of excuses, for example, he states:
the acceptance and rejection of particular excuse defenses can best be explained
by recognizing the criminal law's social role in transmitting ideological rules and
boundaries. The relative culpability of defendants or the deterrence potential of
the criminal law are far less predictive of when and which excuses will be
accepted.
Id. at 4.
100. See, e.g., Renteln, supra note 12, at 441, 500-01.
101. In fact, the Declaration oflndependence expressly promises such rights only to "all men,"
and by "men" meant Anglo-American men.
102. Many might dispute that America is in fact a country accommodating of individual
freedoms. While the reality for many Americans may not reflect the rosy picture envisioned by our
"Founding Fathers," the normative goals are clearly articulated.
103. Wanderer and Connors observe that:
a cultural defense is simply one manifestation of the clash between the individual
and society recognized and treated under our constitutional framework. Although
"culture" may appear to be a new, "flavor-of-the-month" legal interest, associated
with such contemporary concerns as diversity, pluralism, and political correctness,
it is instead just a newly clothed context in which the core, individualistic legal
principles upon which our nation was founded are exercised.
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blameworthiness of an act for those actors who are not acculturated to the
dominant culture unfairly discriminates against them and betrays the ideals
of a democratic society. 1°4
This does not, however, mean that in all cases the goal of
individualized justice should always trump the goal of societal norm
creation and enforcement; 0 5 it does mean, however, that in order to weigh
the balance between the two accurately, the individualized elements
should, in fact, pertain to the defendant. In other words, although moral
blameworthiness is not always the most important consideration, where it
is relevant, cultural differences should be recognized. In the next section,
I propose a reconceptualization of intent that takes into account cultural
dissonance and thus, better captures the moral blameworthiness of the
actor.
IV.

RECONCEPTUALIZING INTENT

The culpability standards of the Model Penal Code and state statutes
fail to contextualize the defendant's actions, and thus fail to capture the
true moral blameworthiness of those actors who fall outside society's
dominant culture. Even those crimes that require specific intent only
provide part of the entire picture if there is cultural dissonance between the
decision-maker and the defendant. Just as acts are tied to the intent
underlying them, intent is tied to context. What we hope to discover by
examining intent is the blameworthiness associated with the act.106
Wanderer & Connors, supra note 64, at 870-71.
104. Other scholars have argued that notions of individual responsibility are misleading or
inaccurate without a social context. See, e.g., ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLiTICS 29144 (1975). For a discussion of the competing perspectives regarding individual responsibility, see
Richard C. Boldt, The Construction ofResponsibility in the CriminalLaw,140 U. PA. L. REV. 2245
(1992).
105. As Kadish notes,
Justice for the individual is not an absolute [in that] it can conflict with the moral
claims of other individuals. Consider, for example, the claim of the law-abiding
for some reasonable government protection against crime. A legal system so
scrupulous that nearly every defendant was acquitted would not only be inefficient
and ineffective, it would be unfair to the citizens who rely on it to articulate and
enforce standards of conduct. Thus, there are moral as well as pragmatic reasons
why a perfect correspondence between an individual's moral fault and criminal
liability is not an absolute value.
Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REv. 271-72 (1987).
106. See id. at 257.
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Thus, for example, the Model Penal Code provides that one of the four
culpability standards must apply in order for a crime to exist."°7 How
blameworthy someone is for doing something depends on what he was
thinking when he acted. When he extended his arms, did he mean to push
the victim? Or was he merely stretching? If he did mean to push, did he
intend to cause harm? Or did he push the victim to move her out of the
way of the speeding car? A determination of intent requires consideration
not only of the defendant's intent to commit the act, but of the defendant's
intent to achieve the consequences of that act.
In some cases, the law already recognizes that one should no longer be
held responsible, or as responsible, for one's actions. Intoxication, duress,
self-defense and insanity are all examples where the law recognizes that
the actor is not as blameworthy as one who is not intoxicated, under
duress, acting in self-defense, or insane.' °s The context indicates that the
actor did not possess the type of evil mind contemplated by the law. So
why not contextualize intent in all cases?
Intent should be relevant to all crimes which require a mens rea element.10 Crimes requiring only a "negligence" or "recklessness" standard
are particularly troubling where the defendant is a member of a cultural
minority because "negligence" and "recklessness" are based upon
dominant cultural norms, without regard to the defendant's experiences
and understanding. Thus, this Essay argues that before a decision-maker
can determine whether the defendant acted negligently or recklessly, the
decision-maker must understand what the defendant intended by her
actions. Not only should intent be a relevant consideration in the
determination of crimes, the meaning of "intent" should be examined to
better understand the meaning of an action within a particular context. I
107. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 (2002). There are exceptions for certain offenses defined by
statute where there is a clear legislative intent to impose strict liability.
108. Arenella observes:
[duress] negates the actors' moral culpability because the defendant succumbed
to coercive pressures that could have prompted a "reasonable person" to violate
the law. Why is his moral culpability negated? Because we can not sustain
our ...attitudes of resentment and blame when we realize that a "reasonable
person," someone with the appropriate attitudes of respect and concern for the
moral norms implicated by the law, would have been compelled to violate the law
despite these attitudes.
Arenella, supra note 9, at 1541-42.
109. As Kadish notes, it is not always clear whether mens rea requirements are essential
elements in the definition of the crime or excuses in "mens rea clothing." Kadish, supra note 105,
at 260-6 1.
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propose a three step analysis of intent to create culpability standards that
reflect moral blameworthiness. Each level presupposes a voluntary act by
the defendant.' ° Conduct that is not voluntary is not, and-should not be,
criminalized as it serves neither the retributive nor deterrent goals of the
criminal justice system.
My proposed reconceptualization of intent provides a context for the
defendant's actions that takes into account the possibility of cultural
dissonance. While cultural evidence currently is, and should be,
considered at the sentencing stage, I believe that it is a critical aspect of
determining whether a crime occurred at all. If a defendant lacks the
requisite mental state, he or she should not be found guilty of the crime.11'
Furthermore, relegating the relevance of culture to the sentencing stage
leaves too much discretion to the judge. As discussed above, a judge may
be more lenient to those defendants who are members of a cultural
minority who act in accordance with dominant cultural norms."'
A. FirstLevel Intent - Intent to Act
In order to determine whether the defendant had the requisite mens rea,
the decision-maker should first determine whether the defendant intended
to commit the act."13 First level intent is equivalent to general intent under

110. Criminal law requires that the defendant's conduct be voluntary. See LAFAVE, supranote
25, §6.1(c).
111. Id. Likewise, neither would the revenge or retribution goals of criminal law be served by
punishing involuntary actions. Id. As LaFave notes, "[t]o some extent, then, all crimes of
affirmative action require something in the way of a mental element - at least an intention to make
the bodily movement which constitutes the act which the crime requires." Id. § 5.2(e).
112. See Kelly M. Neff, Note, Removing the Blinders in Federal Sentencing: Cultural
Difference as a ProperDepartureGround,78 CH-KENT L. REv. 445,462 (2003) (stating that the
Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that a defendant's culture may be considered in
sentencing if the culture is consistent with that of U.S. cultural norms, yet noting that "a seeming
double standard exists as courts allow a defendant's culture to mitigate a sentence if that culture
coincides with the American majority but disallow mitigation if the culture differs from the
majority's.").
113. Kadish notes that there are two ways to classify involuntariness:
on the one hand, these cases can be interpreted as exculpatory because there was
no actus reus, and hence no crime to excuse ...

When a person claims the

involuntary-act defense he is conceding that his own body made the motion but
denies responsibility for it. Therefore, however we characterize the involuntary-act
exculpation, whether as a failure of the prima facie case or as a defense, the reason
it exculpates belongs to the rationale of excuse: the defendant has no choice in the
matter.
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some existing criminal law statutes." 4 For example, in order for the
defendant to be found guilty of battery, the defendant must have intended
to strike the victim, or at least intentionally flailed his arms about without
regard to whether anyone was nearby." 5
B. Second Level Intent - PurposiveIntent
Second level intent is roughly equivalent to specific intent. 116 An inquiry into second level intent examines why the defendant committed the
act and whether the defendant intended the consequences of her act. If the
intent was to avoid a greater evil, the conduct should not be a crime. For
example, imagine a defendant voluntarily pushes the victim. The
defendant intends to extend her arm and intends to physically move the
victim. If, however, the defendant's purpose in so acting is to move the
victim out of the path of a speeding car, then she should not be liable for
the crime of battery. Second level intent is currently reflected in the
existing defense of necessity.'17 Where a person is confronted in an
emergency with a choice of two evils, if the harm which will result from
compliance with the law is greater than that which will result from
violating it, she is justified in violating it."' The analysis of second level
intent, however, is incomplete without examining third level intent.

Kadish, supra note 105, at 259.
114. As LaFave notes, however, the phrase "general intent," is also used to mean something
other than the notion that "all crimes require a general intent." LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 5.2(e).
For example, "general intent," may be used to encompass all forms of the mental state requirement
or to characterize an intent to do something on an undetermined occasion. Id.
115. In addition, the defendant must have, in fact, struck the victim and the act must have
caused bodily injury or amounted to an offensive touching. Id. § 16.2(a). The intent to strike the
victim of course presupposes that the act was voluntary. If, for example, the defendant struck the
victim while suffering from an epileptic seizure, there would be no crime but merely an accident.
116. As with "general intent," there are multiple meanings associated with "specific intent."
See LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 5.2(e). The most common usage, however, is to designate a special
mental element which is required above and beyond any mental state required with respect to the
actus reus of the crime. Id. For example, common law larceny requires the taking and carrying
away of the property of another with the specific intent "to steal" the property. Id.
117. See LAFAVE, supranote 25, § 10.1 (a); see also Parry, The Virtue ofNecessity: Reshaping
Culpability and the Rule of Law, 36 Hous. L. REV. 397 (1999).
118. LAFAVE, supranote 25, § 10.1(a). The defense of necessity, however, is only available
in situations where the legislature has not itself made a determination of values regarding the
weighting of the evils. Id.
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C. Third Level Intent - ContextualizedPurposiveIntent
Contextualized purposive intent requires a consideration of the
defendant's larger purpose in acting and includes what is traditionally
referred to as the defendant's motive. It asks why the defendant wants to
achieve her purpose." 9 Thus, third level intent abolishes the distinction
between motive and intent by conflating these two often indistinguishable
concepts. 2 0 Contrary to what some may expect, third level intent analysis
does not always work to the advantage of the defendant. In the example
above, assume second level intent analysis demonstrates that the defendant
pushed the victim in order to move the victim out of the path of the
speeding car. If third level intent analysis demonstrates that the defendant
pushed the victim out of the way of the speeding car because the defendant
intended to later torture and kill the victim (i.e., cause greater harm), then
the defendant should be found guilty of the crime of battery (as well as any
other relevant crimes such as attempted murder).' 21
All three levels of intent must be examined in order to successfully
determine culpability. In some cases, public policy might dictate that no
intent should be required in order to prevent harm to the larger public.122
I do not wish in this Essay to examine the wisdom of strict liability crimes

119. This question reflects the view that an individual not only should act, or refrain from
acting, but that she should do so for a certain reason. See Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, 2004
StanfordLaw Review Symposium: Punishment andIts Purposes:PunishingHatredandPrejudice,
56 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1093-96 (2004) (discussing how some proponents of hate crime legislation
might argue that since it is "wrong to assault another, it is a greater wrong to assault another for a
bad reason such as racial hatred.").
120. Many commentators have criticized the supposed distinction between motive and intent.
Robinson has noted that "every time an offense definition contains the phrase 'with the purpose
to. . . ,' the law takes the actor's motive as an offense element, the cause of his or her act." Paul
H. Robinson, Hate Crimes: Crimes ofMotive Character or Group Terror?, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 605, 606-07. See also Adam Candeub, Comment, Motive Crimes and Other Minds, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 2071, 2104-06 (1994) (discussing the confusion surrounding the distinction between
motive and intent but concluding that motives have a wider, broader view).
121. Frederick Lawrence has discussed the purported distinction between "intent" and
"motivation" in the context of hate crimes and hate speech. See Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving
the Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox: Punishing Bias Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech, 68
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 673 (1992). Lawrence observes that the distinction between motivation and
intent is unclear and should be seen as "descriptive points on a continuum whose normative weight
must be found elsewhere." Id. at 680. He further notes that "what is a matter of intent in one
context, may be a matter of motive in another." Id. at 720.
122. Although the criminal justice system does not now require a showing of moral
blameworthiness for all crimes, it does tie legal blame to moral blame for serious mala in se crimes.
See Arenella, supra note 9, at 1513 ("To convict the individual of a mala in se crime, the state must
provide proof of his moral culpability for breaching the law's commands.") Id.
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in general,12 but because such crimes do not require intent at all, they do
not pose the same cultural dissonance problems as those that do require
intent. 124
With the exception of cases involving strict liability crimes, the law
25
does require and recognize different states of mind for different crimes.
The state of mind determines the crime or the punishment for a crime. But
because crimes as currently defined assume that the judge and jury share
the same cultural and experiential framework as the defendant, they often
fail to adequately reflect the culpability of the actor in cultural defense
cases.
Culture is often distilled to mean ethnicity, but can also refer to
practices of a group of a particular region, socioeconomic class, or
education level. These categories reflect distance from the mainstream of
modem, middle class Anglo-America. Language barriers aggravate that
distance.
To illustrate, let us imagine that a child severely injures her knee
playing outside. The knee is cut to the bone. The child's mother does not
take the child to the hospital, and the knee becomes infected. Is the mother
guilty of child endangerment? For purposes of this analysis, let us assume
that the act happened in California. California Penal code section 273a
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to
produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any
child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or
mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child,
willfully causes or permits the person or health of that child to be
injured, or willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a
situation where his or her person or health is endangered, shall be
punished by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year,
or in the state prison for two, four, or six years.

123. For a criticism of strict liability in the context of excuse, see Kadish, supranote 105, at
267-69.
124. This does not mean, of course, that strict liability crimes do not pose any discriminatory
problems. As strict liability crimes often reflect community norms, they may disproportionately
impact those who are unaware of those community norms.
125. See Dane S. Ciolino, The Mental Element ofLouisiana Crimes:It Doesn't Matter What

You Think, 70 TuL. L. REv. 855 (1996) ("Most crimes require culpability-proof that the offender
committed the prohibited act with a specified blameworthy state of mind.").
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(b) Any person who, under circumstances or conditions other
than those likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully
causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care
or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or
health of that child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits that
child to be placed in a situation where his or her person or health
may be endangered, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
The mother in our example acted "willfully" when she failed to take her
child to the hospital. The term "willful" in this case does not require intent
to injure the child but implies merely a purpose or willingness to commit
the act, or make the omission referred to.'26 The standard of conduct is that
of criminal negligence, which means that the defendant's conduct must
amount to a reckless or gross departure from the ordinary standard of due
care.' 27 Yet, is the mother in our hypothetical the type of mother that the
legislators had in mind when they drafted the statute? When her actions
are viewed in isolation, the answer is likely yes because the factfinder
superimposes his own world onto hers and makes certain assumptions
about her life that are not necessarily true. But, let us contextualize the
defendant's actions and assume that the defendant is a Korean immigrant
who speaks very little English. Let us further assume that she lives in Los
Angeles, does not drive and does not have health insurance. Imagine that
the accident occurred in the evening, and that she has four other children
all under the age of eight. She does not know her neighbors, she is
separated from her extended family, her husband is away on business.
What are her options? She could take the bus late at night with her five
children - but would that not be more irresponsible? Do her actions still
look the same as they did when we had no understanding of the context in
which they were undertaken?
When the decision-maker first hears about her actions, would he not
automatically assume that she could drive, that she had a car, that she had
health insurance, that she did not have other children or that if she did, she
had a spouse or neighbor that could watch them? In other words, would
the decision-maker not make the assumption that she was like he?
Or perhaps, the decision-maker would conclude that she was so
different that legal standards do not apply at all. Then, the defendant is at
the mercy of a court, subject to its pity and its paternalism. Perhaps a court
126. Deering's (2005) notes accompanying section 273a, citing People v. Pointer, 151 Cal.
App. 3d 1128, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1st Dist. 1984).
127. See id.
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might excuse her actions. Or perhaps a court might decide that she was
ignorant and did not know how to raise children. What was that child
doing playing outside at night anyway? Perhaps ajudge would decide that
her children would be better off if they were taken away from her and put
into foster care. Perhaps the judge would decide that he knew better, better
than this non-English speaking mother of five. But that determination fails
to take into account her parenting abilities as a whole. It fails to take her
actions into context. What matters is not what her actions looked like to an
outsider, but what they meant. Did they mean that she did not care about
her child? That she was not concerned about her child's health? That she
was incapable of caring for her child?
The purpose of the child abuse statute is to protect children from
abusive parents. Yet, where there is cultural dissonance, the statutes may
fail to accomplish the legislative purpose. How can we properly judge our
hypothetical mother's actions unless we consider her contextualized
purposive intent? In other words, how do we know whether she acted
negligently unless we know why she did what she did? Is it not important
to view her actions in their actual context rather than superimposing upon
them a context 12
that is reflective of dominant culture norms but is in this
1
artificial?
case,
The paradigmatic cases, People v. Chen, and People v. Kimura, are
useful to illuminate how the proposed intent analysis would operate. In
Peoplev. Chen, defendant Chen voluntarily lifted his arm to strike his wife
with a hammer, and his intent in doing so was to kill her, or to at least
cause serious bodily harm - thus meeting the requirements of first and
second level intent. Third level intent analysis requires us to ask why he
intended to kill her. Cultural evidence is particularly useful here, provided
that the evidence is accurate and meets the requirements of the codified
rules of evidence. 129 The cultural evidence was used to demonstrate that
news of his wife's infidelity would enrage a Chinese man more than it

128. Joshua Dressier uses a similar example to illustrate how there are constant pressures on
courts to "subjectivize" the "reasonable person": "For example, if the defendant, a man of low
education or low mental acuity, is prosecuted for negligently causing the death of his child, the
defendant may seek to have his conduct judged by the standard of a reasonable person with a
similar level of education and/or mental acuity." JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAW 132 (3d ed. 2001). Yet, as Dressler notes, the traditional rule is that "although a defendant's
unusual physical characteristics ... if relevant to the case, are incorporated into the 'reasonable
person' standard, a defendant's unusual mental characteristics are not." Id.
129. Cultural evidence is often subject to much less rigorous scrutiny than other types of
"expert" testimony. The intent analysis does not diminish the need to ensure that proffered cultural
evidence is subject to the evidentiary standards of other types of evidence.
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would a man who was born and raised in the United States. 3 ' Thus, it offers an explanation for the defendant's behavior, but not one that
exculpates him. In fact, the evidence disproves the conclusion that he
acted "recklessly," rather than intentionally. Assuming for the sake of
analysis that the evidence was accurate, it shows that Chen did in fact
intend to kill his wife because even if an American-born man should not
have been driven to murder, a Chinese-born man would have been. It also
shows the mitigating condition of extreme emotional disturbance, that
Chen was more upset by the news of his wife's affair than an Americanborn husband in the same situation.
An intent analysis might have provided a more satisfying exculpatory
rationale for the defendant's actions in Peoplev. Kimura.Kimura's actions
meet the requirements for both first and second level intent - she acted
voluntarily, and she intended to drown her children. Third level intent
requires that the decision-maker ask why she intended to drown her
children. The evidence regarding oya-ko shinju explains her third level
intent - that she wanted to protect her children from public humiliation
and the stigma of being motherless.

V. CONCLUSION

If one way that we can define culture is by shared assumptions in a
given social context,' we know that judges and jurors are often not of the
same "culture." A jury of one's peers does not mean Chen is entitled to a
jury of Chinese immigrants, Kimura to one of Japanese housewives, or
Kong Moua to one of Hmong tribemen. If a primary objective of the law
is to establish and enforce social norms, how much should we
acknowledge cultural differences? If a defendant committed an act
because the act was legal in her home country, should we recognize this

130. There has been much discussion that the evidence offered in Chen was inaccurate and
unreliable. See Coleman, supra note 1, at 1108.
131. Anthropologists have come up with various ways to define cultures. Etienne Vermeersch
called it "the total way of life of a people, the social legacy the individual acquires from his
groups." See Etienne Vermeersch, An Analysis of the Concept of Culture, in THE CONCEPT AND
DYNAMICS OF CULTURE 10 (Bernardo Bernardi ed., 1977). Morris Freilich refers to culture as "all
those historically created designs for living, explicit and implicit, rationaland irrational,and nonrational,which exist at any given time as potentialguides for the behavior of men." See Morris
Freilich, The Meaning of "Sociocultural," in THE CONCEPT AND DYNAMICs OF CULTURE, supra,
at 89. Webster's Dictionarydefines culture as the "customary beliefs, social forms, and material
traits ofa racial, religious, or social group." WEBSTER'S NINTHNEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 314

(1988).
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as a defense in the United States? The short answer is no, because the
actions are occurring within the borders of this country and we have long
established that ignorance of the law would not provide an excuse. But the
issue of whether we can establish our own crimes should be made distinct
from whether we should recognize moral responsibility in defining those
crimes. We have long concluded that in the vast majority of cases, we
should. We recognize for example, the immaturity of minors. We
recognize self defense. So what about culture?
The cultural defense is a sticky issue because it raises the spectre of
foreignness, of othemess. If a defendant commits a crime that would not
be a crime in his or her home country, the legality of her actions in her
home country does not impact her moral responsibility in this country. Her
knowledge of the laws of this country is not relevant. But her intent in
committing the act is relevant, just as intent is relevant for all defendants
of most crimes. If the individual's understanding of the ramifications of
an act is affected by that individuals' cultural upbringing, then it does
affect her culpability. If, for example, the defendant believes that she is
saving her child's soul by committing oya-ku shinju, is she not less
blameworthy than a mother who kills her children so that she can run off
with her boyfriend? 3 2 It would be artificial
to conclude that there is no
133
difference between those two situations.
132. But see Coleman, supra note 1, at 1142-43:
Apart from the doctrinally inconsequential fact that Susan Smith drowned her two
children by sending a car in to lake water in South Carolina, rather than by holding
them physically under ocean water in California, the facts of the Smith Case were,
in all relevant aspects other than culture, the same as those in Kimura. Despite
these essential similarities, the States' reactions to the two cases were markedly
different.... [W]hen Kimura is set free at least in part because drowning her
children is consistent with her native cultural practices, while Smith is charged
with capital murder for essentially the same act, there is a troubling disparity in
the way the legal system is responding to the substantially similar actions of the
two women.
133. As Lee points out, Smith
while superficially similar, is not truly analogous to the Kimura case. First, Smith
never intended nor tried to kill herself. She strapped her two young boys into their
car seats and pushed the car they were in into a lake, never once putting herself in
any danger. Second, the reason Smith killed her children was in order to please her
boyfriend, who had made it clear that he was not interested in continuing a
relationship with a single mother burdened with two young children. In contrast,
Kimura not only intended to kill herself, but her primary intent was to kill herself.
It was only because she thought she would be dead that she decided to kill her
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The proposed three-level intent analysis fits within the framework of
what we, as a nation, hold dear. We already recognize that punishment is
linked to culpability. But for some reason, culture has fallen into a special
category because it has an exoticizing effect.
Our fear of relativism, of replacing our country's values with those of
another country, has made us shun anything that resembles giving
"special" treatment to anyone. 34
' Feminists are wary ofrecognizing culture
because in so many countries, women are subordinate to men.'35 Yet, we
also fear the spectre of Western imperialism and colonialism, and are
afraid of disregarding the values and virtues of multiculturalism. So into
the abyss of the debate between feminists and multiculturalists, liberals
and relativists, the relevance of culture falls when it should be nestled
within the larger topic of the relevance of mens rea, of criminal intent.
Intent, while not always an element of a crime, has always been
relevant to criminal law, but the way it has been defined and distilled, as
mens rea and culpability, means that intent does not always capture moral
blameworthiness. Actions do not always signify
the same thing.'36 Our
37
own culture is not neutral, it is not "sign-free."'

children. In Japan, the mother is primarily responsible for child rearing. Children
who grow up without a mother are viewed with distrust. Kimura felt a tremendous
responsibility not to leave her children in this world without a mother.
supra note 17, at 123.
134. See Coleman, supra note 1, at 1135-45 (arguing that "the use of immigrant cultural
evidence in criminal proceedings fundamentally conflicts" with the equal protection doctrine).
135. For example, an Amnesty International representative has remarked that one constant
worldwide is the very low status of women. See Hearingon InternationalHuman Rights Abuses
Against Women Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and InternationalOrganizationsof the
House ofRepresentative Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 101 st Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1990) (statement of
Goler Butcher of Amnesty International, U.S.A.); see also Nancy Kim, Towarda FeministTheory
of Human Rights: Straddlingthe FenceBetween Western Imperialismand UncriticalAbsolutism,
25 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 49, 90 (1993) (noting that because women are in most societies
relegated to the private sphere, and political and social issues are resolved in the public sphere,
participation by women in the creation of culture is often restricted).
136. Levine observes that "[a]lthough the law treats act and intent as distinct elements of a
crime, often we presume intent from the behavior itself, based on our cultural traditions,
understandings and taboos." Levine, supra note 5, at 47.
137. Linguists, psychologists, and literary critics have long wrestled with the "problem of
meaning" or "signification" attached to words which mean something other than their literal
definition. See ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 111 (1958) (noting that "facts" are often "tokens
for something else.") In fact, semiology itself is a "science of forms, since it studies significations
apart from their content." Id.; see also FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS
(1972) (discussing how language is a "social institution.., a system of signs that express ideas").
Id. at 15-16.
LEE,
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We assign meaning to behavior, 38 even for those who do not share our
social background. Cultural evidence is thus relevant because it helps us
to understand that our assumptions may not be accurate, that the defendant
in acting might not have meant what the decision-maker would have meant
had the decision-maker done the same thing. A three-step analysis of
intent forces us to look at the broader context without succumbing to the
temptation to exoticize and misjudge.
Reconceptualizing intent does not treat cultural minorities
"differently." Intent has always been relevant in determining guilt or
innocence; levels of culpability have always affected punishment and
sentencing. But the issue of intent has in recent years become more
complex because the "who" has become more complex. Whose intent? We
are no longer as similar as we have been in the past - if we were ever in
fact so. It may be simply that now there is more a recognition, an
awareness, of how we are not the same. We are not the reasonable man
(i.e., educated, Anglo-American, middle class) that academics and jurists
of the past conjured up. So who are we? The question is an important one
to ask because it lies at the core of what criminal law does (or should do)
- assign accountability for acts based upon culpability, and assign
culpability according to moral responsibility.13 9

138. See Kenneth Karst, Paths to Belonging, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 307 (1986).
139. As Kadish notes, "To blame a person is to express a moral criticism, and if the person's
action does not deserve criticism, blaming him is a kind of falsehood and, to the extent the person
is injured by being blamed, unjust to him. It is this feature of our everyday moral practices that lies
behind the law's excuses." Kadish, supra note 10, at 87.
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